Israel’s Oct. 26 military strike against Iran represented a watershed moment not only for the region, but for the entire world. Not only was it the first major direct Israeli military attack on the Islamic Republic, but it was clearly intended to send a strong message to the mullahs in Tehran.
But first, lets be clear about what that message was — by sending over 100 aircraft into the skies over Iran, and operating virtually unimpeded and seemingly at will for several hours, Israel was essentially telling Iran that it can strike whenever it wishes and do whatever it wants.
Iran’s Soviet-supplied air defence system, the S-300, proved no match for Israeli F-35 and F-15 strike aircraft. Israel targeted a wide range of military sites and air defence systems tied to the country’s energy and petrochemical industries. Iranian media has reported that four soldiers defending those sites were killed.
With the attack, the ball is now back in Iran’s court. Tehran has to decide whether to respond (again) and begin a new wave of escalatory strikes, or to let the current crisis pass.
The signs so far have been mixed. On the positive side, official Iranian state media was quick to downplay the strikes, even going so far as to claim they were limited and caused “little damage.” But since then, the regime’s language has grown steadily more threatening, first, claiming Iran had a “duty” to respond, and most recently suggesting that there will be “bitter, unimaginable consequences” for Israel. These seemingly contradictory responses to the severity of Israel’s attack may suggest a divided government, pulled in opposing directions by competing factions.
For its part, Israel clearly thought long and hard about the targets it hit, and almost certainly adjusted them after its initial plans were leaked to an Iranian web site. It made sure to not directly strike oil or nuclear facilities, as both constitute “red lines” which Iran would have felt obligated to respond to. Rather, the targets were carefully selected to not force Tehran’s hand, and there appears to have been only one civilian casualty.
Other factors will, no doubt, influence Iran’s decision. Perhaps most critically, the Iranian economy is in terrible shape, and can ill afford a full-scale war with a richer, more technologically-advanced foe. And Iranian military officials are certainly aware that Israel’s military is the most powerful in the region, as they have watched it decimate their allies, Hamas and Hezbollah, over the past several months.
Further, Iranian officials also know that outside of their ballistic missiles — which thus far have been largely unable to get past Israel’s defence systems — Tehran has no weapons that can hurt Israel. Its Air Force, as but one example, is barely functional, and would prove no match for the Israelis. Thus, it would enter any larger conflict with Jerusalem from a position of weakness.
However, at the same time, Israel must consider some factors that should give it pause as well. Most obviously, its military is no doubt fatigued after operating at a high tempo for over a year in Gaza and for the past several months in Lebanon. Israel’s army has had to be reinforced by civilian reservists, and these men are likely tired of the endless fighting and are looking forward to returning to their normal lives.
And while Israel does not comment on its weapons supplies and stockpiles, many analysts have started to ask difficult questions about whether its running low on munitions, including the anti-missile systems upon which the Iron Dome depends. While Israel produces some of its weapons domestically, it relies on Washington for the vast bulk of its arsenal, and many have even wondered about weapons supplies in the U.S. So Israel has its own reasons for wanting to avoid a full-scale war.
All that said, I expect Iran will retaliate, and, once again, the odds of a larger war will be heavily reliant on chance. That is, if Iran succeeds in having one of its missiles evade Israeli defences, striking an apartment block or a crowded market causing significant civilian casualties, Israel will have no choice but to escalate further.
And next on Israel’s target list will be the oil and nuclear facilities, which it no doubt wanted to attack this time, but was talked out of by President Biden. An attack on oil facilities would likely devastate Iran’s economy, while an attack on nuclear facilities would likely lead to an Iranian dash for a bomb (assuming the attack is not totally successful). And an attack on either would almost certainly provoke a powerful Iranian response.
Israel and Iran have been edging closer to full-scale war for several years. So far, cooler heads have prevailed on both sides. But the governments of both states contain political hard-liners who would like nothing more than to strike the other side with serious force with the intent of causing significant damage. Should either side not be able to contain those calling for such strikes, the two countries, the wider region, and indeed the entire world, will ultimately pay the price.
Andrew Richter is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Windsor
National Post